

race to invest in production facilities has pushed down profit margins while at the same time driving up the prices of all the inputs—labor, raw materials and energy.

And just as the demand for factory workers reached record levels, the young rural population began to decline in the late 1990s, the result of China's tight family planning policies. For the first time since China's opening up, Chinese factories now need workers more than the workers need them, says Ms. Harney.

Also complicating the situation is a new generation of workers that are better educated and more aware of their rights. Ms. Harney concedes that there is no national labor movement, no coordinated actions and not even a charismatic leader. However, workers are teaching themselves about the law, are being helped by a host of grass-roots NGOs, and courts are handing out higher awards.

Facing labor shortages, the booming coastal provinces of Guangdong and Fujian began to consider inland areas where wages are still low, but the infrastructure in many of these places is still poor. Others began to consider Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia. Ms Harney says there is talk in Japanese business circles of a "China-plus-one" strategy: maintaining operations in China while having operations in another country as a risk hedge.

Does this spell the end of China as a manufacturing powerhouse? Probably not. Ms. Harney says China still has an advantage in its large population, good infrastructure, and industrial clusters, manufacturing centers in which entire supply chains (clusters) have sprung up, providing components, machinery repair and raw materials within a two-hour distance. It will take time for other countries to replicate the cluster effect, she says.

Still, Ms. Harney says to remain competitive, China will have to move up the high-tech ladder and begin to promote its

own brand names.

The obstacles include lax law enforcement, shortages of skilled labor and management, rampant piracy, and a lack of creativity and innovation. These are all daunting challenges. How China manages this transition would be a perfect topic for Ms. Harney's second book.

RIOTS, POGROMS, JIHAD:

RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE IN INDONESIA

by John T. Sidel

Cornell University Press, 304 pages, \$21



Reviewed by SADANAND DHUME

TWO YEARS AFTER the brouhaha over Danish cartoons depicting the prophet Mohammed, the world is bracing for another round of Islam-related turmoil. The feared flashpoint: a film by the flamboyant Dutch member of parliament Geert Wilders that links violence by contemporary Muslims with violent passages in the Koran. Mr. Wilders' predicament—he lives under armed guard and can't find a television station that will air his film—symbolizes the rapid inroads made by radical Islam, or Islamism, in Europe. To put it bluntly, thanks to an influx of immigrants from the Muslim world, the famously iconoclastic Dutch have less freedom to criticize religion today than they did a generation ago.

Half a world away, the former Dutch colony of Indonesia, the world's most populous Muslim-majority nation, faces not dissimilar troubles. Long synonymous with a gentle folk Islam that was remarkably relaxed toward non-Muslims, Indonesia has struggled since the mid-1990s with

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Complicit in killing 500,000 suspected communists, the New Order deliberately encouraged organized religion.

outbreaks of religious violence. In *Riots, Pogroms, Jihad*, John Sidel, a professor of international and comparative politics at the London School of Economics, sets out to analyze and explain the reasons.

Mr. Sidel traces the roots of religious conflict in Indonesia to Dutch rule. He contends that the Dutch system of pillarization, in which Catholics and Protestants developed their own religious schools, associations and political parties, was mimicked in Indonesia to a striking degree. A person's religious identity—Catholic, Protestant, nominal Muslim or orthodox Muslim—determined his schooling and, ultimately, his access to power through the legislature, the civil service or the military.

Against this backdrop, the advent of General Suharto's New Order regime in 1966 led to a deepening of Islamic piety and a gradual shift toward orthodoxy. Complicit in the slaughter of 500,000 suspected communists from 1965 to 1966, the New Order quickly took steps to inoculate the country against a communist comeback. It forced Indonesians to declare their religious faith, expanded religious instruction in state schools and banned interfaith marriages. Figures on religious education capture the scale of change. In 1942 Indonesia's 1,870-odd pesantren (Islamic boarding schools) taught 140,000 students. By 1997, the year before Suharto stepped down, the number of pesantren had swelled to nearly 9,400 and their students to 1,770,000.

The combination of religious instruction in state schools and the mushrooming of Islamic schools helps explain what Mr. Sidel, quoting the scholar Gregory Starrett, calls the evolution of the Indonesian understanding of Islam from "an unexamined and unexaminable way of life"

to "a coherent system of practices and beliefs."

To the casual observer, these changes first became apparent in the mid-1980s, in the profusion of headscarves on college campuses, in the prayer calluses on the foreheads of the devout, in the shiny-domed mosques that sprung up in villages, towns and cities across the archipelago. Over time these pious and newly assertive Muslims began to jostle for power with traditional secular Muslim and Christian elites.

There is much to commend in this book. It touches upon the link between Islamic piety, especially of a strictly scriptural sort imported from the Arab world, and outbreaks of religious violence. It emphasizes the importance of conspiracy theories in mobilizing mobs, and the pivotal role played by so-called professional Muslims: Islamic teachers in state schools, functionaries in the ministry of religion and the propagandists of the Islamist media. Mr. Sidel's painstaking research shows how trivialities—say the sound of a motorcycle outside a mosque during prayers—can spark a full scale riot. His willingness to tackle something as inherently imprecise as identity is refreshing. His observation that Indonesia's jihadists belong to loose networks of like-minded activists rather than to the strictly hierarchical command structures portrayed by some of the more enthusiastic terrorism experts is astute.

Ultimately, however, this book's central thesis is unconvincing. Mr. Sidel accurately details the profound (and ongoing) changes in Indonesian society over the past three decades. Nonetheless he traces Muslim-Christian violence neither to growing Muslim assertiveness nor to the birth of an Islamist movement dedicated to ordering both society and the state ac-

cording to the medieval precepts of sharia law. Instead he plumps, somewhat bizarrely, for the notion that it is not hardened religious identity (to borrow his prolix term), but anxiety about a perceived threat to this identity that fuels the riots, pogroms and jihads of the book's title. Overall, this theory, along with an elaborate typology to distinguish between riots, pogroms and jihads, feels forced.

In a similar vein, Mr. Sidel dismisses the idea of an organized Islamist movement in Indonesia and suggests that the worst of the country's troubles are over. "Jihad in recent years in Indonesia should be understood not as evidence of an ascendant, insurgent Islam but as a symptom of the weakness of those who have tried to mobilize in its name." This apparent profundity can appear plausible if you meditate upon it long enough, unless you happen to consider the obvious fact that the truly weak—Falun Gong practitioners or Burmese democracy activists or Pakistani Christians—aren't typically in the business of shipping armed men to battle their opponents, or of organizing coordinated bombing campaigns.

Fortunately there is an explanation of both the upsurge in religious violence in Indonesia starting in the mid-1990s and the relative lull of the past three years that does not require a breathtaking display of mental gymnastics. Presidents seen as Islamist-friendly (Suharto after 1990, or his successor, B.J. Habibie) or weak (Abdurrahman Wahid) tend to embolden rioters and jihadists alike. Stronger presidents with non-sectarian credentials—Megawati Sukarnoputri and the incumbent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—have the opposite effect.

The international stance toward Islamist extremism in general and jihadist violence in particular has also played a role. Before 9-11 and the Bali bombings of 2002, Indonesia and its Islamists were

largely ignored. Since then, heightened attention from the international press along with arms and training for Detachment 88, the highly skilled anti-terrorism unit within the Indonesian police, have broken up plots before they could be executed and diminished the prospects of large scale religious violence. Unfortunately, though, violent Islamism remains only the tip of the proverbial iceberg. It is the non-violent yet unrelenting pursuit of the same extreme ends—through elections, administrative fiat, and a sophisticated education and propaganda effort—that will ensure that Indonesia's troubles with Islamism, like the world's, aren't about to disappear any time soon.

**THE RELUCTANT COMMUNIST:
MY DESERTION, COURT-MARTIAL,
AND FORTY-YEAR IMPRISONMENT IN
NORTH KOREA**

*by Charles Robert Jenkins, with Jim
Frederick*

*University of California Press,
192 pages, \$24.95*

Reviewed by MARTIN LAFLAMME

THERE IS SOMETHING endlessly fascinating about people who chose to defect to a totalitarian regime of their own free will. One cannot help but wonder what complex combination of hope and despair, ignorance and beliefs, fear and broken expectations, can push a man to leave everything behind and bet his whole future on a vague and often illusory promise of a better life.

Some cases are relatively straightforward. It is not too difficult to understand

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