

level of discourse is more compelling than his belief that China won't democratize.

What is the alternative to engagement? Mr. Mann concedes there isn't much. The U.S. had leverage in the early 1990s, when the Chinese economy was relatively weak and the government more isolated post-1989. In his first year in office, U.S. President Bill Clinton drew a line in the sand, demanding improvements in human rights or else he would revoke most favored nation trading status. The deadline arrived and Mr. Clinton backed down. Since then the U.S. has lacked all credibility on this issue. But perhaps it is possible to switch to a more muscular form of engagement. Why should the U.S. give China any more face if, for instance, it fails to convince Pyongyang to honor its nuclear promises?

It's amusing that when a columnist in the *China Daily*, the English-language state mouthpiece designed to put forward a friendly face to foreign visitors, ranted against this book, he wasn't even allowed to discuss the substance of Mr. Mann's arguments. Instead these were summed up as "political issues." He dismissed the book's author as suffering from "tunnel vision." Somehow that sounds just like something Washington China hands would say.

**BUILDING MODERATE
MUSLIM NETWORKS**

by Angel Rabasa, Cheryl Benard,
Lowell H. Schwartz and Peter Sickle
RAND Corporation, 216 pages, \$30

Reviewed by SADANAND DHUME

IN RECENT YEARS it has become axiomatic to claim that radical Islam can only be defeated with the help of its kinder, gentler twin—moderate Islam. Except for one small problem: How do you define a moderate Muslim? The

easiest way is to draw a sharp line between the violent—the legion of suicide bombers and throat-slitters who have made a permanent home in our headlines—and everyone else. Most people, it seems, can agree that lopping off a Japanese engineer's head while chanting a verse from the Koran, or detonating a bomb-vest in a pizza parlor, aren't quite acts of moderation.

Beyond that it gets trickier. For example, it turned out that Ahmad Abu Laban, the Danish-Palestinian imam who whipped up last year's cartoon crisis—slyly adding three especially inflammatory images to the comparatively mild original cartoons, and then touring the Middle East to publicize the alleged insult to Islam—had long been deemed a moderate. Danish taxpayers funded his visits to the Middle East, in effect subsidizing the network-building that allowed Mr. Laban to so effectively turn Muslim wrath against his adopted home.

Or take Yusuf al-Qaradawi, the Egyptian cleric and *éminence grise* of the Muslim Brotherhood, whose message reaches millions through his Web site Islamonline and through his popular show on Al Jazeera, *Shariah and Life*. London's mayor, Ken Livingstone, has called Mr. al-Qaradawi a "leading progressive Muslim." This despite the fact that Mr. al-Qaradawi refers to Palestinian suicide bombers as "martyrs," supports female genital mutilation, and can't make up his mind whether the proper Islamic punishment for a homosexual is to burn him alive or to toss him off a cliff.

Neither Mr. Laban nor Mr. al-Qaradawi would pass the RAND Corporation's somewhat more discerning use of the label "moderate." In a landmark report published in late March, four RAND scholars draw a nuanced yet common-sense distinction between radical and moderate Muslims, and make sweeping policy

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prescriptions that, if implemented, will fundamentally alter the way Western governments tackle what is arguably the most pressing threat of our times.

The report rests on two simple insights. First, that Muslim movements ought to be judged by the ends they seek rather than by the means they employ toward those ends. Moderates are those who exhibit a long-term commitment to democracy, accept non-Islamic sources of law, profess respect for the rights of women and minorities, and actively oppose terrorism and other forms of illegitimate violence. Some useful questions: Do they believe in freedom of conscience, including freedom of religion? Do they support the right of women and religious minorities to seek and hold high office? Do they see internationally recognized human rights as universal, or do they seek an Islamic exception?

The authors recognize that the War on Terror is a misnomer—that the battle is against an ideology rather than a tactic. To some, al Qaeda may resemble little more than a nihilistic criminal enterprise—a kind of Cali cartel whose profits are booked in paradise—that can be fought with beefed-up law-enforcement tactics. In reality Osama bin Laden merely represents the most violent expression of the ideology of radical Islam (or Islamism), which seeks solutions for 21st-century problems in seventh-century Arabia, and which calls for Islam to dictate every aspect of life. For the West, defeating this ideology will require a clarity of purpose and firmness of will last seen in the heyday of the struggle against Soviet communism.

Of course, as the authors acknowledge, the parallel with the Cold War is flawed. The Soviet Union had a nation state to protect, and could be counted on to act

in rational self-interest. (The prospect of consorting with dark-eyed virgins in paradise didn't quite enter your average Soviet military planner's calculations.) Moreover, communist governments were openly hostile to the capitalist West. By contrast, today's ostensible allies—Saudi Arabia and Pakistan to name just two—are as much a part of the problem as they are part of the solution. The Soviet empire was centralized; Islamism is a disaggregated force. Fifty years ago, the central media challenge was getting the facts across the Iron Curtain. Today it's fighting an overload of disinformation and propaganda, such as the widely believed canard that Jews were tipped off in advance about Sept. 11. And while the Soviets threatened communist takeover, the immediate Islamist challenge comes less from their capacity for control than from their capacity for chaos, at least in the West.

Perhaps most tellingly, though the report touches upon this only briefly, the educated Muscovite shared cultural common ground with his peers in West Berlin or New York. The CIA-funded Radio Liberty hired Russian émigrés to host programs that highlighted Russia's own humanist traditions, including the legacy of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky. At times, information warfare meant mailing Western classics such as James Joyce's *Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man* and George Orwell's *Animal Farm* to intellectually hungry Czechs, Poles and Hungarians. Soviets and Americans might have disagreed over the word "freedom" in the Congress of Cultural Freedom, a pivotal anticommunist organization. But at least they both had a similar understanding of "culture."

Nonetheless, comparisons with the Cold War aren't entirely overblown. Both

communism and Islamism are totalitarian ideologies with global ambitions. If Moscow and Beijing represented different brands of communism, then Riyadh and Tehran do the same for Islamism in its Sunni and Shiite variants. In Saudi-funded groups such as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, you have the equivalent of the Soviet World Federation of Democratic Youth. Islamist-friendly outfits such as the Council on American-Islamic Relations and the Muslim Council of Britain perform a role similar to that of Western communists a generation ago: acting as apologists for the movement, and wherever possible slowing down efforts to keep it in check. Finally, Islamists from Egypt to Indonesia have borrowed the Leninist idea of a highly committed vanguard to lead the movement.

The RAND report argues that network-building holds the key to combating the radical threat. Though they are a minority in most Muslim societies, access to global networks and petrodollars gives radicals the edge over moderates. This balance can be corrected by giving moderates—from pious Muslims such as the Indonesian cleric Abdurrahman Wahid to avowed atheists such as the outspoken Syrian-American psychologist Wafa Sultan—the wherewithal to fight back. Special attention must be paid to liberal and secular academics, young moderate clerics, community activists, women's groups, and journalists, writers and commentators. As in the Cold War, the hands-on work of building these networks ought to be undertaken by quasi-independent organizations specifically set up for this purpose. To guard against backlash, the U.S. ought to partner with local NGOs wherever possible.

You can't fault the report's authors for lack of ambition. They suggest focusing first on places where moderate Muslims still have a fighting chance—Europe, Southeast Asia and moderate Arab societ-

ies. These networked moderates will then gin up “modern and mainstream” interpretations of Islam, and channel them back to societies dominated by Islamist thought.

But given that the flow of ideas in the Muslim world tends to be one way—from the Arab heartland to the peripheries in South and Southeast Asia—this may be a bit of a stretch. It's also unclear whether moderates, who often lack the fervor and conviction of their radical peers, have it in them to put up a serious fight. And the report leaves open the question of some sort of organized force that could balance the Islamist penchant for mob violence and intimidation. But these are mere quibbles. All in all, this important contribution to the policy debate ought to get the serious attention it deserves.

**CHINA: THE ART OF LAW
CHRONICLING DEALS, DISASTERS,
GREED, STUPIDITY AND OCCASIONAL
SUCCESS IN THE NEW CHINA**

by Mark E. Schaub

CCH Hong Kong, 488 pages, \$48



Reviewed by GORDON G. CHANG

IF YOU CONSIDER yourself innocent, stop reading. Mark Schaub's book on the legal aspects of doing business in China is certainly not for you. Even before the table of contents, he suggests his advice is for the guilty, the foolhardy and the corrupt. The rest of you will probably not last to see your deal signed, he warns. So goodbye, *sayonara, zaijian* to all gentle souls. You will have to look elsewhere for your China advice.

≈ *Mr. Chang practiced law in China and is author of The Coming Collapse of China (Random House, 2001).*